susceptible to damage from continuous cropping and constantly requires action to improve the soil such as composting deep plowing and soil dressing If farmers leasing farmland were in an environment where they were able to freely decide whether or not to invest in land improvement no problem would arise However if their intention to invest in land improvement is inhibited by some factors the problem of inefficient farming due to underinvestment may arise The problem of underinvestment is most likely to occur under off the record farming contracts yami kosaku where the contract period is not specified An off the record farming contract is a typical form of incomplete contract Since it is incomplete farmers are unable to predict in advance whether the landowners will behave opportunistically e g asking for the return of the farmland immediately after the tenant farmer makes an investment in the land and this makes farmers reluctant to invest in land improvement i e holdup problem Meanwhile farmland leased under off the record contracts is not always subject to underinvestment Mutual trust between lender landowners and tenant farmers may deter the landowners from opportunistic behavior In short in farmland leasing the relationship between the landlord and the tenant the form of leasing contract and the contract period are highly important Thus this paper presents an econometric analysis of strategic behaviors by lender landowners and tenant farmers regarding choices for farmland lease contracts establishing right of use basis or off the record contract basis and choices for land improvement investment to clarify the determinant factors for the choices Although underinvestment in land improvement is a classic phenomenon that has been constantly observed in land use transactions no analyses of this phenomenon employing modeling or quantitative approaches have been conducted I therefore believe that analyzing serious land related institutional problems is a socially significant enterprise The target area of the analysis is Atsumi cho now Tahara City Aichi Prefecture Atsumi cho experienced a drastic change in its regional agriculture after the completion of Toyokawa Canal in Before the canal was completed the area mainly produced wheat and potatoes But after a full scale water supply was started from the canal major crops shifted to vegetables and flowers taking advantage of the area s mild climate As a result Atsumi cho has achieved remarkable growth as a prominent production center of cabbages and chrysanthemums grown through the illumination method boasting extremely high agricultural production income per farm household with seven times higher than the national average in Atsumi cho was chosen as the target area for the analysis on farmland lease contracts and land improvement investment for the following two reasons First Atsumi cho has large upland farming areas which is absolutely necessary for the purpose of this analysis According to the Census of Agriculture and Forestry in rice paddies account for of the total operated farmland area of Atsumi cho while upland farm fields account for With such a small rice paddy area Atsumi cho is an appropriate place to be used for discussions on land lease contracts for upland farming Second as explained below it is assumed that the land lease market in Atsumi cho structurally gives landowners strong bargaining power When the landlord has strong bargaining power the tenant has to accept the offer of an off the record contract from the landlord even though they prefer establishing land use rights in order to eliminate instability of land lease Since the landlord can easily find another tenant the cost of opportunistic behavior is lower than when the tenant has stronger bargaining power In short when the landlord has strong bargaining power beneficial expenses problems often arise with tenants unable to recover the costs they paid for land improvement investment and therefore Atsumi cho is suitable for this analysis Regarding farmland lease contracts especially the choice between cash rent and share crop contracts many studies have been conducted both theoretically and empirically However no studies have analyzed the issue of lease contract choices econometrically focusing on the stability of farmland lease contracts oral or written short term or long term contracts except the studies by Allen On the other hand Jacoby and Mansuri investigated the choice of non contractible investment i e farmyard manure and tenancy duration on the leased land using detailed plot level data from rural Pakistan during
The highlight of Jacoby and Mansuri is that non contractible investment is underprovided on the leased land even after controlling the endogenous problems based on using plots within the same household to deal with tenant s unobservable characteristics and the landowner s cultivating status the landowner s proximity to the plot to consider the plot condition on the leased land In Japan studies on farmland lease contracts and land improvement investment have been conducted by Furue Kajii Shimamoto Tashiro  Yoshida  and others The background of these studies was the fact that short term leases use right system had been promoted by the government which resulted in the emergence of problems related to beneficial expenses Therefore discussion in these studies seems to focus only on the legal framework concerning and the calculation of beneficial expenses Meanwhile Katsura conducted comprehensive and systematic analysis of lease contracts and beneficial expense related problems based on a detailed survey of arboricultural lands Analysis by Katsura was from the perspective of contract and organizational economics absent from other studies and thus marked a milestone achievement in the study of farmland lease contracts and beneficial expenses
With these preceding studies in mind this paper s analysis is unique in the following three ways First the target of this paper s analysis is upland farm fields Past studies on agricultural land lease contracts and land improvement investment mostly focused on arboricultural lands Katsura Tashiro and very few targeted upland farm fields Kurauchi and Kondo Kurauchi and Kondo p point out that land lease for upland farming comprises not only the issues related to each aspect of land rent contract period and beneficial expenses but also various elements that require analysis of mutual regulations and complementary relationships among these aspects and therefore the choice of upland farm fields as the analysis target is of great significance Second the choice of lease contract type use right establishment or off the record contract basis is discussed in this paper Although Katsura stated that the stability of lease contracts influences incentives for land improvement investment he did not mention the determinant factors for choice of lease contract In reality landlords and tenants choose the type of lease contract according to their characteristics If it is assumed that there is a relationship between a contract s stability and the incentives for investment it is important to discuss how the choice of a lease contract affects stability of the contract Third the data set used for this paper is highly unique As described above past empirical studies of lease contracts did not sufficiently reflect the characteristics of both the landlord and the tenant of a lease contract in the econometric analysis Our study employed a specially arranged questionnaire which enabled us to obtain data on attributes of both landlords and tenants and to control endogenous problems This study is also sig-nificant in terms of building up an effective data set in Japan where very few econometric analyses of farmlands have been conducted using micro data Here land lease contracts on an off the record contract basis and on an establishing use right basis are compared Also the legal framework concerning claims for reimbursement of beneficial expenses is outlined and the relationship between land lease contracts and land improvement investment is clarified For tenants the greatest advantage of a contract establishing use rights over an off the record contract is that the terms including the amount of rent and contract period are made clear and therefore management stability is secured Inamoto
The political aim of establishing use right is to promote short term leases But with the contract period clarified though short farmers can feel safe to invest in land improvement Moreover under establishing use right contracts the level of rent is often determined according to a standard rent which prevents the rent from soaring However since this advantage of lower rent on the tenant side is a disadvantage for landowners landowners o en prefer off the record contracts On the landowner side the advantage of an establishing use right contract is obviously that it is easy for them to ask for the return of the leased land Meanwhile there is also a disadvantage in establishing use right which is lack of flexibility Unlike off the record contracts concluded annually under a use right based contract in which a certain period is specified the landowner is unable to farm the land until the contract period expires It is fine if the landlord is a non farmer landowner or an aged farmer with no successors But if the landlord is a farmer who values highly the opportunity cost of loss of flexibility e g facility grown vegetable flower farmers temporarily renting out their excess farmland an off the record contract is often preferred to a use right based contract
There are also institutional obstacles that inhibit landowners from concluding lease contracts on an establishing use right basis Such institutional problems include agricultural lands for which lease for use right was established upon receipt of management transfer pension under the farmers pension system and agricultural lands to which inheritance tax deferral is applied Ando
Once a landowner lends a large area of his her land under the legal lease scheme the landowner will lose various rights including the right to purchase farmlands over a the status as the insured of the farmer s pension over a and the right to be elected to agricultural committees over a This is one of the factors that inhibits landowners from concluding establishing use right contracts Meanwhile the advantage of an off the record contract over a use right based contract is contract simplicity meaning low transaction costs Allen and Lueck As Fukuda p pointed out an off the record lease contract is based on the relationship of trust between individuals and its transaction costs are usually low If such contract is concluded under the legal scheme i e in a written form through establishment of a use right the transaction cost will rise For both off the record contracts and use right based contracts the right to claim reimbursement of beneficial expenses is guaranteed by the Civil Code To be precise under the unjust enrichment doctrine of Article of the Civil Code Article of the Civil Code ensures the possessors right to claim reimbursement of expenses With respect to beneficial expenses including amounts paid by a possessor to improve Thing in his her possession limited to cases where there is a current increase in value the possessor may at the election of the person recovering the Thing have the person recovering the Thing reimburse monies the possessor paid or the amount of the increased value Therefore tenants are able to recover unamortized expenses for land improvement investment upon completion of the lease contract regardless of the type of lease contract off the record or establishing use right basis
In fact few tenants have exercised the right to claim reimbursement of beneficial expenses This does not however mean no problems have arisen relating to beneficial expenses The reality is that beneficial expense related problems do not appear to have occurred because necessary land improvement investment has not been made And the problem of underinvestment in leased lands or so called holdup problem has occurred instead
The holdup problem is more likely to appear in off the record lease contracts which do not specify contract period than in establishing use right contracts which specify contract period Regarding this point Ka tsura p mentions the beneficial expense related problem in off the record contracts and the relationship between contract period and composting Katsura argues based on interviews with farm land tenants in Hokkaido that under an off the record contract landowner benefit is often prioritized when a beneficial expense related problem arises and that with a lease period shorter than the effective fertilizer period farmers cannot compost the land for fear that the land will be leased to others
The above can be summarized as follows although the Civil Code allows tenants the right to claim for reimbursement of beneficial expenses it costs a lot to actually exercise the right because of its vagueness Beneficial expense related troubles can be avoided by concluding a lease contract which establishes use rights between the landlord and the tenant But when the lease contract is an off the record type the likelihood of the holdup problem is higher Here characteristics of the lease market and lease contracts in Atsumi cho are outlined within the parameters of the analysis below
The first feature is related to the structure of the lease market Figure shows changes in indexes of tenant farmers and landlord farmers Here according to Tabata the ratio to total farm households of farm households with full time farmers younger than is used as the tenant farmer index and the ratio of full time farm households with no working age men Class part time farm households with household heads in full time employment and Class part time farm households with household heads running a business to total farm households is used as the landlord farmer index As clearly shown in the figure in Atsumi cho since the tenant farmer index has been consistently higher than the landlord farmer index This contrasts markedly with the national and prefectural averages This trend indicates that there is a large demand for land lease in the lease market of Atsumi cho giving landlords strong bargaining power
Moreover the land lease market of Atsumi cho has another unique point in that the level of rent has not changed for several decades Though the reason is not certain this trend indicates that the level of rent does not function effectively in compensating for the imbalance between supply and demand in the lease market and that the level of rent is not a significant determinant factor in decision making by landlords and tenants concerning land lease contracts
The second feature is that many lease contracts are on an off the record basis Table  shows Source Census of Agriculture Notes The tenant farmer s index is the ratio of farm households with full time farmers below to total farm households The landlord farmer s index is the ratio of full time farm households with no productive age men and Class part time farm households with the household heads having a full time job or running a business to total farm households But for the ratio is to the number of commercial farm households Considering the fact that figures for are based on commercial farm households and not linked to other years dotted lines are used Table shows the relationship between contract rents and land prices in reference to the number of cases of lease right establishment and paid transfer of land ownership under the Act on Promotion of Improvement of Agricultural Management Foundation To make it easier to evaluate land yield the table presents the contract rents and land prices side by side Also for the convenience of discussing the relationship between contract rents and land prices only the land growing cabbages is presented As shown in the table the most common contract rent level is yen a of all followed by yen a yen a and yen a Compared to the standard farmland rent of yen a the rent level is relatively high As to the land price level million yen a is most common of all followed by million yen a and million yen a
The land yield rate obtained from the average contract rent and land price is which is extremely low This low yield is however not caused by the high land prices reflecting the conversion prices but by the low rent level In fact according to an interview survey net income of land is as high as nearly yen per a though it fluctuates annually and therefore the land yield in terms of land net income is not so low This means that because the rent level is too low the land yield rate becomes low as a result Features of lease contracts and the lease market in Atsumi cho can be summarized as follows
The lease market of Atsumi cho seems to have a structure in which lenders of farmland have strong bargaining power Therefore tenants only have the choice of whether or not they accept the contract offered by landlords and have little chance for further negotiation As to the types of lease contracts off the record contracts are most common while leases based on establishing use right and under Article of the Agricultural Land Act are very few If lease contracts based on establishing use right or under Article of the Agricultural Land Act are concluded their contract period is often longer than years With these characteristics of many off the record leases and strong bargaining power on the landlord side the likelihood of beneficial expense related problems is extremely high in Atsumi cho
The data used for this study is the results of a survey on future agricultural promotion in the Atsumi Peninsula region conducted by the National Agricultural Engineering Research Institute now The Japanese Institute of Irrigation and Drainage targeting farmers in Atsumi cho Aichi Prefecture This survey was conducted in November and December with the aim of gathering the opinions of farmers concerning the promotion of agriculture in the Atsumi Peninsula region
To ensure statistical effectiveness the questionnaire was sent to farm households selected at random from the membership list of Atsumi cho Land Improvement District of which were returned due to wrong address etc
In the random sampling considering the difference in the number of farm households including landowning non farm households between areas former mura villages and oaza districts households were selected from former Izumi mura were selected from former Fukue cho and were selected from former Iragomisaki mura
The final response rate was This paper presents the analysis using the data on farm fields of tenant farm households that can provide all necessary variables for quantitative analysis Attributes of the sample farm households leased farm fields are outlined below It is natural that a farmer first tries to rent farmland from relatives or landowners in the same neighborhood In the meantime however the ratio of landlords and tenants who are in a friendship or acquaintance relation as well as the ratio of landlords residing outside the The table also shows that many landlords are in their s and s and the ratio of landowning non farm households is high of all But there are also many landlords that are full time farmers indicating that even full time farmers if they are engaged in facility based farming often lease out their excess farmland In Atsumi cho not only landowning non farm households but also full time farm households can be landlords which is a unique trend that is rarely seen in other regions
Before presenting the measurement model the form of land improvement investment used for measurement should be determined Actions considered to comprise land improvement investment in Atsumi cho are application of compost cow horse manure bark compost deep plowing replacing surface soil with subsoil and soil dressing According to interviews with land tenants applying compost every or years costs about yen a and deep plowing every years costs about yen a Few tenants hesitate to invest in compost application and deep plowing because their effects are short term and costs are low On the other hand soil dressing is an action with long term impact even semipermanently in some cases and it costs as much as yen a Therefore whether or not to conduct soil dressing is an important decision for tenants Moreover soil dressing is particularly significant in Atsumi cho for purposes other than improving productivity Since Atsumi cho is in a typhoon prone area without soil dressing to raise the ground level of farm fields fields may be flooded when a typhoon strikes causing root rot on cabbages and resulting in a substantial reduction in yield In short soil dressing is significant for Atsumi cho in terms not only of improving productivity through soil improvement but also of avoiding risk of damage from typhoons Bearing this in mind soil dressing is determined as the form of land improvement investment to be used for measurement
The purpose of our quantitative analysis is to verify the following hypotheses Hypothesis I : Farmers are encouraged more to conduct soil dressing under a written contract.
This Hypothesis is to clarify the relationship between the stability of contracts and incentive for investment Here we need to pay attention to the endogenous problems in each contract type The relationship between contract types and investment in soil dressing is described in Table  The table shows  that under oral contracts farm fields of oral contracts made no investment in soil dressing and farm fields have made investment in soil dressing while under written contracts farm fields of written contracts made no investment in soil dressing and farm fields have made investment in soil dressing The proportion of farm fields that have made investment in soil dressing is higher under written contracts Fisher s exact test proves the statistical significance of this relationship level Although the result of cross tabulation indicates that there is a significant relationship between contract type and soil investment we cannot simply conclude that written contracts raise incentives to invest in soil dressing as we need to take into consideration the possibility that the contract type is an endogenous variable Discussion of this matter should be made after checking the endogenous characteristics of each contract type Hypothesis II: Farmers are encouraged more to conduct soil dressing if they can trust landowners.
Trust here refers to the subjective belief of the tenant that the landlord will behave opportunistically e g asking for return of leased farmland immediately after the tenant makes an investment in the land etc It is impossible for a tenant to know in advance whether the landlord will actually exhibit opportunistic behavior or not But the tenant seems to form some subjective belief regarding the possibility that the landlord may behave opportunistically Thus when the landlord s attributes degree of engagement in agriculture age etc and relationship with the tenant in terms of kinship and geographical proximity can assure the tenant that the landlord will not behave opportunistically the tenant can have a strong incentive to invest The following are the hypotheses proposed regarding the choice of contract type Hypothesis III: When there is a trust relationship between the landlord and the tenant, oral contracts are preferred to written contracts.
A trust relationship between landlord and tenant here refers to a relationship based on kinship or geographical proximity When there is a trust relationship between landlord and tenant they seem to prefer oral contracts to written contracts which require transaction expenses costs for documentation From a similar viewpoint Allen and Lueck proved the presence of trust between landlord and tenant to be a determinant factor for choices of oral or written contract and annual or multi year contract using the variable parameters of Landowner and farmer were related and Landowner and farmer knew each other prior to lease Hypothesis IV: When the opportunity cost of loss of flexibility is high for the tenant, oral contracts are preferred to written
contracts.
Under an oral contract which both the landlord and tenant consider to be an annual contract it is easy for the landlord to ask for return of the leased land On the other hand once a written contract is concluded the landlord is unable to ask for return of the leased land except by means of termination by consent Thus landlords who highly value the opportunity cost of loss of flexibility are likely to prefer oral contracts to written contracts In relation to this point Bandiera demonstrated that when landlord is female landlord belongs to the aristocracy or landlord lives in a different town long term contracts are often preferred to short term contracts because they are unlikely to get engaged in agriculture again Table Explained variable Contract Type is defined to be for a written contract and for an oral contract and Investment is defined to be when soil dressing investment has been made and when soil dressing investment has not been made In the survey tenants were asked whether soil dressing was necessary for each farm field and then whether they had actually invested The farm fields for which the tenants considered soil dressing was not necessary were excluded from the measurement target Consequently of farm fields of tenant farmers farm fields were used as samples for the measurement after omitting farm fields that did not require soil dressing Explanatory variables are the type of contract Contract Type tenant s age Tenant Age kinship relation between tenant and landlord Kinship geographical proximity of tenant and landlord Residence landlord s age Landlord Age and landlord s degree of engagement in agriculture Non Farm Landlord Contract Type is an explanatory variable to verify Hypothesis I Allowing for the endogenous problem of contract type if the parameter marked is positive and significant Hypothesis I can be supported For verification of Hypothesis II the kin- When the landlord and tenant are in a kinship relation the landlord is unlikely to behave opportunistically Therefore the parameter for the kinship relation between tenant and landlord Kinship is expected to be positive When the landlord and tenant belong to the same neighborhood former mura opportunistic behavior by the landlord is likely to be deterred due to internal monitoring Therefore the geographical proximity of tenant and landlord Residence is expected to be positive According to interviews with tenants when the landlord is an old landowning non farmer the landlord will not ask for return of leased land except in the most unusual circumstances because they are unlikely to engage in agriculture again Thus the parameters of landlord s age Landlord Age and landlord s degree of engagement in agriculture Non Farm Landlord are expected to be positive For verification of Hypothesis III the kinship relation between tenant and landlord Kinship and geographical proximity of tenant and landlord Residence are used as the proxy variables for the relationship of trust between landlord and tenant Since the variable Contract Type is defined as for a written contract and for an oral contract the signs for both kinship relation between tenant and landlord Kinship and geographical proximity of tenant and landlord Residence are expected to be negative
To confirm the validity of Hypothesis IV landlord s age Landlord Age and landlord s degree of engagement in agriculture Non Farm Landlord are set as the proxy variables for the landlord s opportunity cost of loss of flexibility When the landlord is an old landowning non farmer the opportunity cost of loss of flexibility associated with conclusion of a written contract is small because the landlord is unlikely to engage in agriculture again Therefore landlord s age Landlord Age and landlord s degree of engagement in agriculture Non Farm Landlord are both expected to be positive First to verify the presence of endogenous In farm fields under written contracts the probability of investment in soil dressing is high due to the sense of security brought by the contracts This result demonstrates that the type of contract influences the tenant s choice of behavior concerning investment supporting Hypothesis I
Next the results of parameters concerning Hypothesis II are explained below
The kinship relation between tenant and landlord Kinship shows a significant positive parameter with significance level Because the parameter is positive the measurement result supports the hypothesis In other words when the tenant and landlord are in a kinship relation the tenant can predict that the landlord will not behave opportunistically and therefore the tenant can invest in soil dressing This is consistent with Katsura s statement p that the tenant does not feel insecure when the landowner is a relative but feels insecure when the landowner is not a relative at all Whether the tenant feels insecure depends on the relationship with the landowner A relative may ask the tenant to purchase the land but never ask for return of the land
The geographical proximity of tenant and landlord Residence shows a significant positive parameter with significance level When the tenant and landlord live in the same neighborhood former mura the landlord is unlikely to behave opportunistically because an internal monitoring function works inside the neighborhood Consequent- ly the probability that the tenant will invest becomes high
The landlord s degree of engagement in agriculture Non Farm Landlord shows a significant positive parameter significant level This indicates that when the landlord is a landowning non farmer the tenant predicts that the landlord will not ask for return of the leased land and therefore the tenant is more encouraged to invest in soil dressing
As to the choice of contract type the kinship relation between tenant and landlord shows a significant negative parameter significance level while the parameter of geographical proximity of tenant and landlord Residence is not significant As the kinship relation between tenant and landlord Kinship supports Hypothesis III off the record leases are likely to be chosen to save the transaction costs associated with contracts when the tenant and landlord are in a kinship relation
The landlord s degree of engagement in agriculture Non Farm Landlord shows a significant positive parameter significance level supporting the validity of Hypothesis IV When the landlord is a landowning non farmer the possibility that the landlord will be engaged in agriculture again is extremely low Reflecting this many written contracts are concluded when the landlord is a landowning non farmer This paper has discussed what factors influence decision making relating to lease contracts of upland farmland and investment in land improvement by land tenants In the farmland usufruct market of Atsumi cho demand for land on lease is great and therefore landlords have strong bargaining power Under such farmland usufruct market structure not only the tenant s attributes but the land lord s attributes influence the decision making concerning the choice of lease contract type and the land improvement investment Considering this point actions by both landlord and tenant were simultaneously incorporated in the measurement model for the analysis of this paper The major findings are as follows First when an establishing use right contract which is a written contract is concluded land tenants are more encouraged to invest in the leased land This indicates that contract type influences the incentive to invest Second the role of trust was verified It was revealed that trust in a landlord which is formed by the landlord s attributes such as kinship relations and geographical proximity with the tenant affects the tenant s investment behavior Third as to the choice of lease contracts it was found that the kinship relation between landlord and tenant and flexibility on the landlord side are determinant factors in the choice This means that off the record lease contracts are preferred when the tenant and the landlord are in a kinship relation or when the landlord highly values the opportunity cost of loss of flexibility These results indicate that even under an off the record lease contract trouble related to beneficial expenses can be avoided if there is a relationship of trust between the tenant and landlord However as they expand their farm management farmers are not always able to find a land lender from among their relatives or residents of the same neighborhood In fact they often lease land from strangers beyond the neighborhood border Under such circumstances the role of trust cannot serve as the only solution to the beneficial expense related problems To prevent the problem of underinvestment in leased land it is necessary to clarify the landlord tenant relationship by establishing use rights However considering the structure of the land lease market in Atsumi cho where the landlord side has strong bargaining power a haphazard emphasis on the importance of establishing use rights is unlikely to encourage the making of contracts establishing use right Therefore Agricultural Committees etc should take the initiative in setting rules for the reimbursement of beneficial expenses e g defining beneficial expenses determining calculation methods and discussing measures to put the rules into practice Incidentally the phenomenon of lack of land improvement investment associated with farmland transactions is not a problem unique to Atsumi cho Thus the approach to analysis of this paper can also be applied to for example Hokkaido which is a typical upland farming area For such an attempt however the analysis model needs to be modified according to two characteristic features of Hokkaido agriculture One is that in Hokkaido selling purchasing farmland is as common as leasing Purchasing farmland is the most effective measure to avoid the trouble associated with beneficial expenses Although this paper does not expressly discuss the issue of farmland purchase analysis of the choice between leasing and purchasing of farmland will be necessary if Hokkaido is targeted The other point is that rural communities in Hokkaido have high fluidity due to lack of successors in the families and increasing farm abandonment Tabata
In a fluid community social ties inside a community become weak and the internal monitoring function an effective measure to prevent beneficial expense related trouble cannot work well How these issues unique to Hokkaido can be incorporated into the model will be the key to effective analysis of Hokkaido Off the record farming contract refers to a lease contract concluded based only on a mutual agreement between the landlord and the tenant without being subject to legal land lease procedures notification to and permit by Agricultural Committee
Basically off the record farming contracts are considered to be lease contracts with no contract period specified In this paper off the record farming contracts are sometimes referred to as oral contracts and contracts based on establishing use right and contracts under Article of Agricultural Land Act are sometimes referred to as written con- 
